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SOCIAL ETHICS IN THE NOVELS OF HARRIET BEECHER STOWE 
Alison A. Case 
April 20, 1984 
Harriet Beecher Stowe has engendered a good deal of critical 
contradiction, both in her own time and since. Most of more extreme 
controversy centers on her popular and influential anti-slavery novel, 
Uncle --- Although the New England novels are generally 
considered to have some merit as examples of "local color" fiction, 
Stowe earned her place in the canon of American literature primarily 
on the basis her authorship of UTe. But the place is an uneasy one. 
Q!£ 's pop u 1 a r i t y and imp act rna k e itt 0 0 big an eve n tin Arne ric a n 
literary history for it, or its author, to be disregarded, but dis-
putes about its intellectual, moral, and artistic legitimacy are rife. 
It has been various described by critics as disastrous and miracu-
lous, awkward and artful, dishonest and sincere, keenly intelligent 
and irrationally emotionalistic, racist and anti-racist, feminist and 
all-too-oppressively feminine. 
But whatever else may be said about UTe, few would dispute that 
Stowe wrote it openly, self-consciously, and unapologetical in a 
woman's voice, which, for a novel addressing social and political 
issues of national importance, was at the time something unusual (and 
controversial) in itself. It is perhaps seems less unusual today, but 
I would suggest that in some respects the controvery has remained 
constistent, and that much of the critical argument about UTe may be 
attributed to the problems of interpreting a woman's voice fairly in a 
man's wor ld. 
Stowe was clearly more concerned in this novel with appealing to 
popular tastes than with establishing herself as a sophisticated 
artist. She relied to a certain extent on the forms of the popular 
women's fiction of the day, and the occasional literary cliches which 
result have led many to dismiss the novel as an unusually skilfull 
work of "sentimental"l fiction which, predictab and perhaps regret-
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tably, achieved the popularity its author was so clearly angling for. 
In fact, the word "sentimental" effective sums up most of the 
serious critical doubts about Uncle Cabin, even among those who 
consider it, in some respects, a powerful and admirable work. Many 
are decidedly uncomfortable with Stowe's use of the power of emotional 
appeal on a political issue like slavery. It is hard to dispute that 
UTC succeeded in raising popular support for abolition where cool, 
well-reasoned arguments failed. Nonetheless, her appeal to "the heart 
instead of the head" seems to these critics illegitimate and danger-
ous, even if the cause was unquestionably a good one. This was the 
chief complaint of her contemporary critics, and it has been often re-
echoed since. Thus C.H. Foster concludes his discussion of UTC (1954) 
with the following comment: 
In furnishing the popular mind and heart with 
unforgettable symbols of slavery, Uncle Tom's 
Cabin influenced the people for both good and 
evil. ••• it enlisted the popular will in the aboli-
tion of slavery as no other work had done; but the 
highly personal nature of its argument also made 
the Civil War virtually inevitable. After Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, objective analysis of the slavery 
issue -;asalmost impossible.,,2 
"Sentimentalism" also sums up the discomfort of some feminist 
critics. The value Stowe places on feminine "influence" within the 
home sphere, her emphasis on motherhood and her glorification of 
female self-sacrifice (all in keeping with the tradition of "sentimen-
tal" fiction) make it easy to see her as adopting and promoting an 
oppressive angel-in-the-house doctrine of feminine "influence," 
designed by a male dominated society to keep women from any effective, 
independent action. Ann Douglas, for example, opens The Feminization 
of American Culture with UTC's Little Eva, and thus places Stowe in 
the center of the sentimental authors she sees idealizing women as 
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powerless parasites. 3 
But both Foster and Douglas see another side to Stowe which is 
difficult to reconcile with the perceived shortcomings of her "senti-
mentalism." Foster recognizes in the cynical comments of Augustine 
St. Clare an intelligent and insightful analysis of the abstract 
issues of economic and political power which underlie the institution 
of slavery, an analysis which gives the book its "masculine edge ~and l/i . >"~--
intellectual bite."4 Douglas too, sees an awareness of issues 
of power, especially as they relate to the sexes, and sees also the 
glimmerings of a--covert--female activism: 5 Stowe presents women as, 
generally, the moral superiors of men, and in her novels they chal-
lenge men's judgement even outside their domestic sphere with con-
fidence and conviction. Indeed, her own writing of such an indecorous 
and unladylike novel as UTC indicates that she could not have been 
wholly an advocate of passivity and propriety in women. 
These virtues seem to both Foster and Douglas inconsistent with 
Stowe's problematic sentimentalism. Hence Foster argues for a "doub-
leness"6 in Stowe's work, with feminine emotionalism alternating with 
masculine analysis, and Douglas suggests in her introduction to UTC 
that beneath Stowe's apparent acquiescence to the feminine values of 
her time was the hidden, subversive message that feminine influence 
was ineffective unless backed by "less gentle tactics."' 
But when critics begin to postulate a kind of authorial schizo-
phrenia in order to be able to reconcile intelligent analysis with 
emotional response, femininity with activism, perhaps it is time to 
take a new look at our paradigm for interpretation. The problem, 
unfortunately, is not confined either to literature or to the 19th 
century. Carol Gilligan's recent book on the psychology of women's 
ethical perceptions, In ~ Different Voice, points out a similar diffi-
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culty of interpretation in current psychological research and parti-
cularly in her own field of moral development. Gilligan saw women's 
responses to moral questions being interpreted--and found wanting--in 
different terms from those in which the women framed moral questions 
for themselves. She found that women, in contrast to men, tend to see 
around them "a world comprised of relationships rather than of people 
standing alone, a world that coheres through human connection rather 
than through systems of rules."S Women therefore tend to see moral 
obligation as stemming from a basic sense of connection with and 
responsibility to other human beings. The key to moral order is the 
maintenance of relationships, connections, and lines of communication, 
and moral character may be measured by one's ability to extend the 
circle of relationship to strangers and even enemies, and by the 
degree to which one accepts responsibility for anyone within it. 
Immoral behavior is seen, not so much as rule-breaking, but as a 
failure in the communciation of, or response to, human needs. 
This "ethic of care" contrasts with a moral view Gilligan found 
more associated with men, which she refers to as an ethic of "jus-
tice." The latter locates morality in a concern for "fairness"--for 
applying moral rules with objective equality--according the self no 
rights not extended to all. Each of these two ethics require a dif-
ferent "logic" for making moral choices. One demands a complex under-
standing of the psychological realities of a particular situation--a 
"psychological logic"-- to understand exactly what the needs involved 
are, how conflicting needs may be weighed against each other, and how 
they might best be fulfilled. The other requires an equally complex 
abstract understanding of a ~rarchy of moral laws, to be able to 
determine which takes precedence in a particular situation· 
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In [the women's] conception, the moral problem 
arises from conflicting responsibilities rather 
than from competing rights and requires for its 
resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual 
and narrative rather than formal and abstract. 
This conception of morality as concerned with the 
activity of care centers moral development around 
the understanding of responsibility and relation-
ships, just as the conception of morality as fair-
ness ties moral development to the understanding 
of rights and rules. 9 
Though I will be referring to them as "masculine" or "feminine," 
these views are by no means exclusive to the genders with which they 
are, in general terms, associated, nor are they mutually exclusive. 
They are, as Gilligan says, "two views of morality which are comple-
mentary rather than sequential or opposed."ID In fact, as 
Gilligan points out in her last chapter, at their highest level of 
development these two ethics merge in the ideal of "justice tempered 
with mercy" --or perhaps, from the other perspective, "mercy made 
manageable by justice". 
But in real life their relationship is more complicated, and here 
the gender associations become significant. Although an ethic of care 
and response may be implicit in the highest ideals of a justice-
oriented morality, in our society it has tended to be the masculine 
perspective which is accorded moral and intellectual legitimacy. From 
the "justice" perspective, an approach to moral choice which relies on 
empathy seems dangerous, in that it undermines the "objectivity" 
necessary for a "good" moral choice. Hence Freud says that the 
woman's superego is inferior in that it is never '''so inexorable, so 
impersonal, so independent of ~ts emotional origins as we require it 
to be in men.,"ll In addition, because an abstract, rule-oriented logic 
is the only one recognized as legitimate, the "psychological logic" of 
the feminine approach seems illogical and unintelligent -- an unrea-
soned, emotional "gut-response." It is thinking with the "heart" and 
5 
not with the "head." Thus while women's values affirm what is missing 
in the masculine view of morality, namely, "the continuing importance 
of attachment in the human life cycle," the prevailing standard of 
interpretation "intones the celebration of separation, autonomy, indi-
viduation, and natural rights,"12 so that interpretation of women's 
moral thought reaffirms women's inadequacy and justifies their infer-
ior sta tus. 
This, I think, has been the problem in criticism of Uncle Tom's 
Cabin. The outlines of the ethical view Gilligan delineates in her 
work are clearly visible throughout Stowe's anti-slavery and New 
England novels, and Gilligan's analysis can thus lead to a greater 
appreciation of the coherence and intelligence of Stowe's moral 
vision, and help us to tease apart "the description of care and con-
nection from the vocabulary of inequality and oppression" in criticism 
of Stowe's work. 
On the most basic level, this ethic manifests itself in her 
tendency to define characters and situations in terms of their rela-
tionships, moral character in terms of empathy and sense of responsi-
bility to fellow-humans, and spirituality in terms of a sense of 
personal connection to and relationship with God. In other words, 
Stowe sees a world which "coheres through human connection." 
But this ethical view also emerges on the level of a conscious 
concern--one which is central to both the New England and the anti-
slavery novels. Stowe is quite well aware of the association of her 
perspective with women, and of a more legalistic perspective asso-
ciated with men which tends to dominate in the public realm and which 
denies the legitimacy of women's views. Her novels include a critique 
of this masculine view. Seeing empathy and a sense of personal res-
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ponsibility as the basis for morality, she sees that an emphasis on 
impersonal rules can become a way of avoiding responsibility, evading 
the claims on the self which any genuine expression of human need 
ma ke s. "Objectivity" becomes a mask for self-interest. 
With this critique in mind, it becomes necessary to re-evaluate 
Stowe's narrative,~trategies in a novel such as Uncle Tom's £abin. 
Perhaps her appeal to the hearts of her readers does not preclude one 
to their heads as well, and perhaps the "objective analysis" which 
Stowe made "impossible" was not the only intelligent, legitimate 
response to the moral problem of slavery in the South. 
Stowe's New England novels, !he Minister's ~ooi~ (1859) and 
Oldtown Folks (1869), were written several years after Uncle Tom's 
Cabin, but they can serve to give us a clearer idea of the conception 
of moral order which is implicit in the anti-slavery novels. Late 
Eighteenth Century New England seems to represent for Stowe a stable, 
morally healthy society in which law, social convention, and personal 
conviction are essentially in harmony. Disruptions in moral order are 
also breaks in the fabric of the community, which are restored by 
common effort. By looking at the way Stowe presents communities and 
characters in this "normal" world, and the way she discusses moral 
problems, we can perhaps get a sense of the ideal which resides behind 
Stowe's presentation of the disordered world of the anti-slavery 
novels. 
The conception of moral order in these novels aligns very closely 
with Gilligan's outline of a feminine "ethic of care," and of the 
distinctive world-view which shapes it. Underlying everything in 
these novels is a tendency to view relationships as the primary real-
ity in human life, whether relationships between members of a 
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family or community, or those between individuals and God. Stowe sees 
the New England community as one which coheres through a network of 
'personal relationships, centered on those of the home, and extending 
out to include the whole town, with connections going out from there 
to the world at large. All notions of class and race, or of economic, 
political and religious structures are subordinated to this view, in 
the eyes of the characters as well as the author. She looks at 
religious doctrine, too, in terms of its effects upon the sense of 
connection and personal relationship with God and fellow-
humans which she considers essential to healthy spirituality. 
Stowe defines morality in these novels in terms of respon-
siveness to the needs of others. Moral characters see themselves as 
responsible for the whole community, and a strong feeling of empathy 
leads them to perceive the sufferings of others as their own. In 
addition to a sense of connectedness with others and an ability to 
empathize with suffering, an important element of Stowe's conception 
of moral character is the psychological perception needed to under-
stand what another's needs are and what the best way of meeting them 
is. 
The New England community Stowe describes is fundamentally home-
~ 
and family-centered. The center of action in both novels is the 
home--and especially the kitchen--of the major maternal figure of the 
story: Grandmother Badger in OTF and Widow Scudder in !~~. The home 
serves as a microcosm of the community~ here the representatives of 
its various parts meet and interact. Thus on a Sunday evening Grand-
mother Badger gathers in her kitchen an assortment of locals ranging 
from the eminent Major Broad to the Indians Sally Wonsamug and Betty 
Poganut who come begging for food and shelter. 
Furthermore, it is the interrelationships within the family and 
8 
community which serve to maintain order and ensure that differences do 
not result in destructive conflict. This is most easily seen in OTF, 
whose story ranges over a broader cross-section of New England society 
than TMW. Throughout OTF Stowe represents the major social, poli-
tical, and religious differences of the day -- those between Tories 
and revolutionaries, Anglicans and Congregationalists, Arminians and 
Calvinists, or simply rich and poor -- through individual characters, 
who resolve these differences by subordinating them to a sense of 
relationship as fellow-members of a family or community. Thus Mr. and 
Mrs. Badger, Arminian and Calvinist, respectively, resolve the quarrel 
between these two creeds by subordinating it to the love and respect 
of a lifetime of marriage. The same is true of Parson Lothrop, the 
Congregational minister, and his Anglican Boston-aristocratic wife. 
Within the community as a whole, this resolution is represented, 
again, by the mingling of classes and creeds in Grandmother's kitchen, 
and by the meeting-house. 
In the meeting-house the entire community, from Lady Lothrop to 
the poor blacks and Indians who live on the fringes of the community, 
ar e all un i ted. Differences of rank may be, as Stowe says, carefully 
observed in the community, which has its own miniature version of the 
House of Lords, House of Commons, and humble populace,l3 but these 
seem to express themselves more in "etiquette and solemn observances" 
(OTF,p.93) than in any actual separation of the classes from human 
contact with each other. They, too, are finally subordinated to the 
common bond as members of the same community: 
But such as we were, high and low, good and bad, 
refined and illiterate, barbarian and civilized, 
negro and white, the old meeting-house united us 
all on one day of the week, and its solemn ser-
vices formed an insensible but strong bond of 
neighborhood charity •••• rude and primitive as our 
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meeting-houses were, this weekly union of all 
classes in them was a most powerful and efficient 
means of civilization (OTF,p.IOI). 
OTF and TMW also show very clearly a view of morality which 
stresses a sense of responsibility, based on this same feeling of 
connection to others, to help anyone in need to the limits of one's 
ability. The truly moral characters in both novels are those who take 
on the welfare of the whole community as a personal responsibility. 
The Badgers in OTF are prepared, despite Aunt Lois's protestations 
that it will ruin them, to provide a meal and a night's lodging to 
anyone who comes to their door, Thanksgiving turkeys to all who ask 
for them, and, apparently, a home and education to any orphan who 
seems in need of them. Uncle Fliakim, for his part, seems to have no 
interests or pursuits of his own -- he is continually, and energet-
ically, at the beck and call of his neighbors. 
The same is true of the truly moral characters in TMW. Zebedee 
Marvyn, the prototype of the upright and efficient New Englander, 
finally has to keep two complete sets of tools: one for his own use, 
and one to lend out to needy neighbors. Further examples abound, but 
the point which should be clear is that Stowe is defining virtue in 
terms of willingness to fulfill the needs of others rather than in 
terms of adherence to a code of moral rules. There is no "fairness" 
clause in this moral demand -- in fact, Stowe points out that a con-
tinued willingness to supply others' needs will inevitably lead to 
some exploitation by "those less fortunate persons, who supply their 
own lack of considerateness from the abundance of their neighbors"l4 
Such an ethic might be seen as simply "the law of the Gospel" --
a higher and more difficult moral code rather than a different vision 
of morality as growing out of a personal sense of connection, sympathy 
and responsibility. But Stowe also makes clear that sympathy, human 
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warmth, and the insight to perceive another individual's particu-
lar needs, are crucial elements of her "ethic of responsibility." 
Further, such sympathy and insight often put the "right" action at 
odds with logical principles of "duty," or any abstract, impersonal 
code of behavior. 
n the case of Miss Asphyxia Smith, the spinster who first takes 
on responsibility for raising the orphaned Tina, a rigid performance 
of "duty" to one in need, devoid of any human sympathy or perception, 
is a crime, and one which which nearly destroys Tina's character. 
Stowe's narrator calls Miss Asphyxia's method of rearing Tina by a 
cold and rigid system of rules "soul-murder--a dispensation of wrath 
and death" and comments "such a person is commonly both obtuse in 
sensibility and unimaginitive in temperament" (OTF p.l70). Against 
this Stowe places the "grandmotherly logic" of Mrs. Badger, whose 
theory of child-rearing denies the possibility of abstracting general 
principles for correct action, and emphasizes behavior suited to the 
needs of the individual involved. In a discussion with Aunt Lois and 
Miss Mehitable on the best method for rearing children she argues 
that: 
'One live child puts all your treatises to 
rout •••• There ain't any two children alike; and 
what works with one won't work with another. 
Folks have just got to open their eyes, and look 
and see what the Lord meant when he put the child 
tog e the r' ( Q!.K, p • 2 7 6) • 
Stowe closes this discussion with the comment that people who locate 
"rational" behavior in adherence to abstract principles, like "theo-
rists on education," will see no value in Mrs. Badger's perceptions, 
and "will pronounce her a pig-headed, passionate, impulsive, soft-
hearted body, ••• entirely below the notice of a rational, enquiring 
mind" (OTF,p.278). But despite its lack of intellectual respecti-
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bility by the standards of the day, Mrs. Badger's views are soundly 
based on a rationality of their own, the "psychological logic" of an 
ethic of care, in which Stowe places much greater faith. 
This vision of morality as responsiveness made effective by 
psychological perception ,and its association with women, reaches its 
clearest expression in Stowe's description of Mary Scudder in TMW. 
Mary is one of those 
soul artists, who go through this world, looking 
among their fellows with reverence, as one looks 
amid the dust and rubbish of old shops for hidden 
works of Titian and Leonardo, and, finding them, 
however cracked or torn or painted over with taw-
dry daubs of pretenders, immediately recognize the 
divine original, and set themselves to cleanse and 
restore. Such be God's real priests •••• Many such 
priests there be among women;--for to this minis-
try their nature calls them, endowed, as it is, 
with fineness of fibre, and a subtile keenness of 
perception outrunning slow-footed reason (!~! 
p.606). 
As the above comments on "theorists" and "slow-footed reason" 
suggest, Stowe's advocacy of an "ethic of care" is often closely tied 
to criticism of a more abstract, "objective" approach to morality. 
Abstract principles in themselves, she feels, are too divorced from 
humanity to be able to result in any genuinely benevolent action. A 
classic example of this is Simeon Brown, the slave-trader in TMW who 
is, briefly, a great fan of Hopkins's complex, abstract system of 
theology: 
In his private life, Simeon was severe and dicta-
torial. He was one of that class of people who, 
of a freezing day, will plant themselves directly 
between you and the fire, and there stand and 
argue to prove that selfishness is the root of all 
evil. •• He was one of those men who suppose them-
selves submissive to the Divine will, to the 
uttermost extent demanded by the extreme theology 
of the day, simply because they have no nerves to 
feel, no imagination to conceive what endless 
suffer ing is (!~~, p. 562). 
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Simeon's shortcoming, like Miss Asphyxia's, is his total unwilling-
ness--or inability--to perceive what another might feel--and this 
applies to the person shivering in front of him as well as to tormen-
ted sou Is. In fact, Simeon's absolute faith in moral (and theolog-
ical) logic seems to be part of what leads him astray--he confuses 
reasoning correctly with doing right, and thus hides his selfishness 
from himself. 
With regard to social ethics, New England as Stowe presents it is 
essentially at one. Characters like Simeon Brown and Miss Asphyxia 
may be grudgingly acknowledged as "upright" citizens, but they are 
clearly on the fringes of the community, and are held in contempt by 
its more outspoken members. The only real conflict of values in these 
novels is in the area of theology. !~~ and OTF contain an intelligent 
and complex analysis of New England Calvinism. Stowe's identification 
of its problems and points of conflict show her posing abstract, 
formal logic against the "psychological logic," and give a clearer 
sense of the intellectual basis of her ethical views. 
For Stowe, just as social well-being is based upon a sense of 
connection with fellow-members of a family or community, and morality 
upon responsiveness to particular individual needs, so, for her, spiri-
tual well-being is based upon a sense of relationship with God, and an 
absolute faith in His loving responsiveness to the individual needs 
(though not necessarily the conscious desires) of all His human children. 
Her major criticism of Calvinism is that it destroys this sense of 
relationship with God, denying that it is possible without a definite 
and dramatic conversion experience, and teaching that without this 
conversion the individual is an enemy to God and hateful to him. 
Such a doctrine of separation and hatred between God and the 
majority of humans seems to her spiritually destructive. She is 
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particularly concerned with its effect upon women, who she claims 
found this theology "hardest to tolerate or assimilate," because, as 
she says, "woman I s na tu re has never been consu 1 ted in theology." (OTF 
p.456). the problem is that women, unlike the male logicians who 
construct such doctrines, cannot help but make the connection between 
abstract theories and a human reality which is felt as well as 
thought: 
But where theorists and philosophers tread with 
sublime assurance, woman often follows with blee-
ding footsteps;-- women are always turning from 
the abstract to the individual, and feeling where 
the philosopher only thinks (!~~, p. 541-2). 
Miss Mehitable Rossiter in OTF best describes the kind of anguish 
that results from such teachings, in a passage which points clearly to 
a view of human life as deriving meaning from a sense of connection--a 
belief that a cry of genuine need will be heard, understood, and 
responded to: 
We are in ourselves so utterly helpless,--life is 
so hard, so inexplicable, that we stand in perish-
ing need of some helping hand, some sensible, 
appreciable connection with God. And yet for 
years every cry of misery, every breath of 
anguish, has been choked by the logical proofs of 
theology;--that God is my enemy, or that I am his; 
that every effort I make toward Him but aggravates 
my offense (Q!! p.248). 
These are thoughts which Miss Mehitable has in common with 
several women characters in both novels. But though Stowe associates 
them particularly with women (since women, by their nature, are more 
likely to perceive them and feel them deeply than men) she clearly 
believes that her values are human values. Stowe is careful to include ----
male characters who in one way or another align themselves with the 
same view, such as Jonathan Rossiter, who is lost in a bitter despair 
like that of his sister and clings to Christ as an emblem of a pal-
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pable human connection between God and humanity, and Harry Percival, 
who argues for a sense of loving relationship with God as the primary 
fact from which all theology must derive. 
The cruelty of Calvinism is not limited to its separation of the 
individual from God--what is even more disturbing about it to Stowe is 
that it seems to demand an unconcern for the ultimate fate of others--
whether it is to be salvation or eternal torment. In demarrling that 
believing Christians acquiesce--cheerfully--to the idea that the major-
ity of humans will be damned for all eternity, Calvinist doctrine is 
working directly against a vision of morality which demands that one 
look upon the sufferings of others as one's own. 
It is this inability to keep from being bound up in the fate of 
those close to oneself that drives Mrs. Marvyn to the edge of madness 
when her son James is presumed to have drowned in an "unregenerate" 
state, and she rails against a God who can, by his own choice, harden 
his heart against masses of people, each beloved of their families and 
companions, for his own glory: 
'Think of all Godls power and knowledge used on 
the lost to make them suffer ! ••• The number of the 
elect is so small we can scarce count them for 
anything! Think what noble minds, what warm, 
generous hearts, what splendid natures are wrecked 
and thrown away by thousands and tens of thou-
sands! How we love each other! how our hearts 
weave into each other! And all this ends ••• ' (!~! 
p.734) • 
Even for saintly Mary Scudder, this aspect of Calvinism is 
difficult to live with: 
But when she looked around on the warm, living 
faces of friends, acquaintances and neighbors, 
viewing them as possible candidates for dooms so 
fearfully different, she sometimes felt the walls 
of her faith closing around her as an iron shroud 
(!~! p.542). 
In a society like New England's, in which theology is reality, 
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such theorizing can be seen almost as an act of violence, and like 
most of the officially sanctioned violence in Stowe's fiction,it is 
perpetrated by men who have allowed abstract thought and logical 
principles to blind them to the lived human reality of what they do. 
Jonathan Rossiter comments in OTF, in a passage echoed frequently in 
both novels: 
'It is incredible, the ease and cheerfulness with 
which a man in his study, who never had so much 
experience of suffering as even a toothache would 
give him, can arrange a system in which the ever-
lasting torture of millions is casually admitted 
a san i t em' ( 2.!! p. 2 5 7) • 
Though some of these are men like Simeon Brown, who are simply 
incapable of feelings for others, Stowe does not, on the whole, want 
to condemn Calvinist theologians as heartless monsters. Indeed, in her 
comments on Hopkins and others Stowe makes clear her admiration, if 
not for their conclusions, at least for the impulse that drove them: 
These hard old New England divines were the poets 
of metaphysical philosophy, who built systems in 
an artistic fervor, and felt self exhale from 
beneath them as they rose into the higher regions 
of thought (!~!'! p.541-2). 
Her criticism is that these theologians failed to see the impor-
tance of that combination of a sense of loving unity with God and 
fellow-humans, empathy, and desire to ease suffering and aid the needy 
which Stowe summarizes as "feeling" to their own moral and spiritual 
life. They therefore produce inhuman logical systems of theology, 
devoid of the warmth and empathy which characterizes them as men. 
Hopkins is the prime example of this. Stowe says of him that "the 
only mistake made by the good man was that of supposing that the 
elaboration of theology was preaching the gospel" (!~!,!,p.58l). His 
doctrines alone draw in only "shrewd, hard thinkers, who delighted in 
metaphysical subtleties"--men like Simeon Brown. The rest, who are 
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the "deep-hearted, devoted natures," accept the theology out of love 
for the man, won only by 
"the gospel he was preaching constantly ••• by his 
visitations to homes of poverty and sorrow ••• his 
teaching of those whom no one else in those days 
had thought of teaching C!~!! p.583). 
Stowe1s final conclusions on Calvinism are too complex to discuss 
here. But I think it is clear, from her presentation of the community 
and of the tensions between objective and sympathetic, logical and 
psychological reasoning on ethics and theology that Stowe sees a world 
which coheres more through bonds of sympathy, care and gratitude than 
through any external rchical structures, that she places her 
greatest faith in the moral power of "feeling" rather than that of 
objective principles, and that she is associates "objective" reason-
ing, on any subject concerned with humans, with inhuman results. 
The issue here is clearly not "head versus heart." Stowe's 
criticism of "logic" is not anti-intellectual--in fact, these books, 
and all of their characters, are deeply concerned with intellectual 
issues. What she is criticizing is intellect divorced from any ref-
erence to a landscape of human relationships. "Feeling" for Stowe is 
not a substitute for thought~ it is rather one of the givens from 
which any reasoning must start, and it continually ensures that 
thought never strays too far from a grounding in lived human reality. 
In moral terms, it is also an important link between thought and 
action in the community. 
Stowe's views on matters of "head and heart" are illustrated best 
by her portraits of characters like Mary Scudder in !~!!, with her 
"earnest young face, ever kindling with feeling and bright with intel-
lectl! (p.583), or like Harry Percival in OTF, For these characters, 
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intellect and feeling are never at odds--they are so inextricably 
intertwined that neither would think of trying to separate one from 
another. Their feeling of connection with God and humanity forms the 
foundation of their thought on theological and moral matters, and the 
results often pose challenges to colder doctrines which are logical as 
well as emotional. 
When we come to Stowe1s anti-slavery novels we are dealing with a 
very different world. To Stowe, slavery is the height of immorality, 
and thus the South (and the North as well, to the extent that it 
supports slavery), unlike the New England of OTF and TMW is a sick 
society in which moral disorder has been legally institutionalized and 
socially sanctioned. Because in such a society law and morality must 
be fundamentally at odds, there is in these novels a much more polar-
rized vision of the tensions between a legalistic, "objective" moral-
ity and one based on an emotionally rich human response to indiv-
iduals. The outlines of Stowe1s advocacy of the latter afld critique 
of the former are therefore much clearer. 
But more important, the situation in which the novels were writ-
ten is very different. The New England novels are essentially reflec-
tions on the past--whatever difficulties Stowe had with Calvinist 
theology, she certainly did not view it as a clear and present moral 
threat to the population at large. But slavery was. In these novels, 
then, we see the response of an ethic of care, taking as its basis the 
empathetic response of one individual to another, to a problem of 
institutionalized evil on a national scale. 
In Stowe1s definition of the evil of slavery, we again see her 
vision of the centrality of human relationships to moral order and to 
personal meaning in life. She describes slavery's evil primarily in 
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terms of its effects upon human and divine relationships among slaves 
and slaveowners alike. 
The clearest--and most often noted--example of this is slavery's 
destruction of black families. UTC opens with the threatened separa-
tion of George Harris from his wife Eliza, of Eliza from her son, and 
finally of Uncle Tom from his whole family. From here on, Stowe 
repeatedly portrays slaveowners and traders dividing husbands from 
wives, brothers from sisters, and mothers from children. 
Though Stowe stresses the personal anguish this causes slaves, 
there is also another point to this. When feelings of connection with 
others form the foundation of morality, the disregard for family ties 
exhibited by slaveowners and traders could have moral consequences for 
slaves. This is the basis for Mrs. Shelby's horror at selling Tom and 
little Harry: 
I have taught them the duties of the family, of 
parent and child, and husband and wife1 and how 
can I bear to have this open acknowledgement that 
we care for no tie, no duty, no relation, however 
sacred, compared with money?15 
Her husband later unknowingly concedes what Stowe considers one of the 
greatest indictments of slavery--that it makes a morality based on 
sustaining family connections virtually impossible among slaves--when 
he responds to his wife that she has "burdened them with a morality 
above their condition and prospects" (UTC p.373). 
It is not only with regard to relationships within the family 
that slavery is destructive: the slaveowner's denial of fellow-
feeling with slaves also has demoralizing effects on both. Augustine 
St. Clare's impulsive, dictatorial nephew Henrique is dangerously 
corrupted by his constant association with dependent and subservient 
people whose emotional and physical well-being he is never obliged to 
consider. The lighter-skinned servants in St. Clare's own household 
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imitate this attitude in their contempt and unconcern for darker, less 
"well-bred" fellow-slaves. Rosa's and Jane's inhuman treatment of 
black Topsy--responding to her hideous bruises and scars with the 
comment '''don't that show she's a limb? ••• I hate these nigger young-
uns! so disgusting!"'(QTC p.355)--mimics their white mistress's total 
disregard for their feelings and needs. Indeed, the ever-present 
brutality of slavery eventually eats away the humanity of even such a 
sensitive, loving man as St. Clare--the hopelessness of responding 
humanely to all the suffering he sees around him makes him finally 
give up the attempt: 
'Of course, in a community so organized, what can 
a man of honorable and humane feelings do, but 
shut his eyes all he can, and harden his heart? I 
can't buy every poor wretch I see. I can't turn 
knight-errant, and undertake to redress every 
individual case of wrong in such a city as this. 
The most I can do is try to keep out of the way of 
i t i ( Q!£ , p • 3 2 8) • 
Finally, slavery obstructs that most crucial of relationships: 
that between the individual, slave or free, and God. This happens, 
first, in that intelligent slaves and conscientious whites are dis-
gusted by the hypocritical religious moralism of slaveowners, so 
clearly designed to protect their own privilege. John Van Trompe, a 
former slaveowner who has turned against slavery after seeing its 
injustices, comments: 
"it was years and years before I'd jine the 
church, 'cause the ministers round in our parts 
used to preach that the Bible went in for these 
ere cuttings up, ••• so I took up agin 'em, Bible 
and a II' (Q!£ p. 1 6 0 ) • 
George Harris, though in his heart he wants to believe in God, is 
similarly held back by the perception that slaveowners seem to have 
God on their side. Exhorted by his wife to '''trust in God,'" he 
replies, 
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II an1t a Christian like you, Eliza; my heart's 
full of bitterness; I can't trust in God. Why 
does he let things be so? ••• 1 wish I could be 
good, but my heart burns, and can't be reconciled, 
any how' (Q!£ p p • 6 2 - 3) • 
The ultimate representation of the evil of slavery, life on Simon 
Legree's plantation, is a cruel and total ~nversion of the vision of a 
community sustained by connection and sympathy seen in the New England 
novels. While the New England community coheres through connection 
and love, Legree holds his plantation together through isolation and 
hatred: 
Legree ••• governed his plantation by a sort of 
resolution of forces. Sambo and Quimbo cordially 
hated each other; the plantation hands, one and 
all, cordially hated them~ and, by playing off one 
against the other, he was pretty sure, through one 
or the other of the three parties, to get informed 
of whatever was on foot in the place (UTC p.493). 
With human connections constantly thwarted, morality is virtually 
impossible. On his arrival, Uncle Tom finds nothing but "the gross, 
unrestricted animal selfishness of human beings, of whom nothing good 
was expected or desired" (UTC,p.495). These people have been torn away 
from all the natural connections of family and home community, and 
everything conspires against their developing any fellow-feeling among 
themselves: Cassie tells him, "When you've been here a month, you'll 
be done helping anybody; you'll find it hard enough to take care of 
your own sk in! II (UTC p. 5 04). She sums up the re ign ing ph i losophy of 
the place when she says: 
lAnd what are these miserable low dogs you work 
with, that you should suffer on their account? 
Everyone of them would turn against you, the 
first time they got a chance. They are all of lem 
as low and cruel to each other as they can be; 
there's no use in your suffering to keep from 
h u r tin g the m' (Q!£ p. 5 1 3 ) • 
Cassie herself has long since decided that attachments can only 
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cause pain to a slave--she kills her last son in his infancy, and she 
stops Emmeline's gesture of affection with the words "'you'll get me 
to loving you; and I never mean to love anything, again!'" (UTC,p.580). 
In this atmosphere of personal isolation and despair, any sense 
of God's presence and concern is also missing. Told by Tom that God 
is everywhere, a slave woman replies "'Lor, you an't gwine to make me 
believe dat ar! I know de Lord an't here'" (UTCp.497). Cassie also 
tells Tom, '''There's no use calling on the Lord,--he never hears ••• 
there isn't any God, I believe; or, if there is, he's taken sides 
against us'" (UTC,p.512). Even Tom himself has a long, hard struggle 
to cling to his faith in the face of God's apparent silence here. 
In contrast to Legree and his demonic world, "good" slaveowners 
in UTC, like the Shelbys, are those who have a nurturing, almost 
parental attitude toward slaves, and try to turn their plantations 
into family-like communities founded on trust and love. Mr. Shelby's 
hold over Tom is not one of power and violence--Tom feels an almost 
maternal affection and responsibility toward him because he has cared 
for him since infancy. Similarly, Mrs. Shelby acts as more of a 
mother than a mistress to Eliza, and the latter's obedience stems from 
the dutiful love of a child rather than from fear or compulsion. Even 
the embittered George Harris sees in this bond of love a genuine claim 
on his wife: 
'There is some sen se in (obed ience], in your ca se; 
they have brought you up like a child, fed you, 
clothed you, indulged you, and taught you, so that 
you have had a good education~ that is some reason 
why they should claim you' (UTC,p.62). 
But such harmony and unity in slavery, Stowe stresses, is ulti-
mately unsustainable, because unsupported by the external structures 
of the society: 
Whoever visits some estates [in Kentucky]. and 
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witnesses the good-humored indulgence of some 
masters and mistresses, and the affectionate 
loyalty of some slaves, might be tempted to dream 
of the oft-fabled poetic legend of a patriarchal 
institution, and all that; but over and above the 
scene there broods a portentous shadow--the shadow 
of la~. So long as the law considers all these 
human beings, with beating hearts and living 
affections, only as so many things belonging to a 
master,--so long as the failure, or misfortune, or 
imprudence, or death of the kindest owner, may 
cause them any day to exchange a life of kind 
protection for one of hopeless misery and toil,--
so long it is impossible to make anything beau-
tiful or desirable in the best-regulated adminis-
tration of slavery (UTC,pp.50-1). 
Law is here presented as a system alien to the moral community, 
which disregards and cuts across its bonds. This vision is at the 
core of the critique of objective "logic" and structures of rules as a 
means of making moral decisions, which Stowe returns to continually 
throughout UTC and Dre~. On one level, Stowe's difficulty with these 
structures is obvious: the external, objectivized structure of 
society--its religious and social values as well as its laws--is 
naturally designed to uphold that society as it is. In a slave-
holding society, it is supportive of slavery, and its support serves 
as a further sanction of the original wrong: thus ministers find that 
the Bible supports the institution of slavery and the rights of the 
master, and a social "code of honor" makes it "ungentlemanly" to 
cheat a trader of his slave. 
This tendency is most evident in the legal system. Stowe reit-
era t est h r 0 ugh 0 u t Q!f. t hat the I a w pIa c e s no lim ito nth e power 0 f a 
master over a slave, and that therefore it can do nothing to ensure 
any sort of humanity in the institution of slavery. In Dred she 
devotes several pages to a legal decision by Judge Clayton, in which, 
while lamenting the conflicts between "'the feelings of the man and 
the duty of the magistrate,'" he overturns a previous decision in 
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favor of an abused slave woman. He concludes that it is 
the imperative duty of the judges to recognize 
full dominion of !he Q~ner over th~ slave •••• And 
t his wed 0 up 0 nth e g r 0 u n d t hat !hil§. £Q!!i.!!iQ'!! 
essential to the value QK slaves ~ propertYL to 
!h~ ~~'£.!!f.i!y. !h~ !!~l§.!~f. ~.!!£ !h~ E..!!!?li.£ !f.~.!!':' 
quilli~ ~atly dependent upon their subordin-
ation! 
In other words, judges are obliged to decide on legal cases in a way 
that maintains order in the society as it is, not to decide on the 
justice of the society's institutions. But the Judge is unusual in 
his recognition of a possible gap between what must be upheld legally 
and what can be upheld morally. Ordinary citizens, less conscious 
than a judge is likely to be of the ambiguities of law, tend to 
associate what is legal with what is good and proper, so that slave-
holding law gives the power of the master over slave a kind of moral 
sanction. 
This is apparent, for example, in the conversation between George 
Harris and Mr. Wilson, his well-meaning and essentially sympathetic 
former employer. Mr. Wilson !!deem(sJ it his duty to go on talking 
good" to George, despite the fact that he !!Ican't pretend to defend ' " 
his master's treatment of him. He exhorts George to return to his 
cruel owner, on the grounds that his running away is both !!'setting 
(h i nV self in oppos i t ion to the laws "' and ." w icked--unscr iptura 1. ••• 
the angel commanded Hagar to return to her mistress ••• and the apostle 
sent back Onesimus to his master lll (UTC p.lS3). These pro-slavery 
structures of law and religious doctrine have become the arbiters of 
"goodness," so that Mr. Wilson actually feels that he is doing wrong 
by giving in to his subjective desire to help George. 
Such a critique of these structures may not seem necessarily 
incompatible with with an objective, justice-oriented view of morality. 
Judge Clayton's son Edward, for example, abandons the pursuit of law 
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in the South as a means of doing good because he realizes that the law 
!!1! i! 1!!!!!l£1! i!l !h.~ £2..!:!!h. i sin com pat i b 1 e wit h his 0 w net h i c 0 f 
justice extended equally to all. His disagreement is primarily with 
the £2.!l!~!l! 0 f the 1 a win a s I a v e hoI din g s tat e, w h i c h her e ali z e s 
makes justice for the slave impossible, rather than with law per see 
One might say that, at least for Edward Clayton, Southern law is not 
objective and impersonal enough, in that it does not accord blacks the 
same treatment as whites. 
But beneath this obvious critique of immoral content in the 
codes and structures of slaveholding society there is a more far-
reaching critique of the moral problems inherent in objective codes 
and structures themselves as guardians of morality. Stowe is concerned 
about the ways that objectivity, logic, and legalism--in a slave-
holding society or out of it--can be used as a means of blinding 
oneself to the inconvenient moral claims made on one by other indi-
viduals. Turning a living, breathing human being into an abstraction, 
Stowe recognizes, is often the first step toward allowing oneself to 
behave inhumanly toward him or her. 
This insight is at the core of Stowe's criticism of slavery. 
Throughout UTC and Dred she portrays the supporters of slavery as 
people who have retreated into abstract arguments to prevent them-
selves--with varying degrees of success--from seeing and responding 
to the human reality of the institution they support. This is 
easiest--and hence the greatest temptation--for the makers of public 
policy, such as politicians, church leaders, and social theorists. 
They are dealing with institutions and abstractions and the people 
they are affecting are, for the most part, strangers to them. Remain-
ing indifferent to the individual suffering they cause is simply a 
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matter of not making the effort to seek it out, and this indifference 
is sanctioned by a moral code which would condemn such a concern as 
"weakness" or lack of "objectivity." 
Senator Bird in UTe, for example, argues eloquently in favor of 
the Fugitive Slave Bill, and against the "sentimental weakness of 
those who would put the welfare of a few miserable fugitives before 
great state interests," only because "his idea of a fugitive was only 
an idea of the let ter s tha t spell the wor d" (UTe p.lS S) • The whole 
issue is distant and abstract to him, and he considers it immoral to 
consider it otherwise: 
'we mustn't suffer our feelings to run away with 
our judgement: you must consider it's a matter of 
private feeling,--there are great public interests 
involved, ••• we must put aside our private feel-
ings' (Q!~,p.l44). 
Ultimately, a policy maker or theorist may become so adept at 
distancing himself this way that even "the magic of the real presence 
of distress" does not affect him, like the "thorough-paced political 
economist" Stowe describes in Dred, who, 
surpr ised ••• by the near view of a case of actual 
irremediable distress... would soon have consoled 
himself by a species of mental algebra, that the 
greatest good of the greatest number was never-
theless secure; therefore there was no occasion to 
be troubled about infinitesimal amounts of suffer-
in g (Q£.~Q, I I, p. 1 4 l) • 
But an even more telling condemnation of this process of retreat-
ing into abstraction to deny connection is that it can also oper~te on 
the level of the more personal, almost familial relationships of 
mutual care and trust which should form the basis for a wider-exten-
ding ethic of care and responsibility. Stowe's description of the way 
Mr. Shelby copes with selling Tom and Harry in the first part of UTe 
is a good example. Mr. Shelby can only begin to feel comfortable with 
having sold Tom and Harry by distancing himself from the personal 
26 
meaning of the event. His wife expresses her outrage at the sale in 
terms of their relationships with these particular people: "'Whatl our 
Tom?--that good, faithful creature!--been your faithful servant from a 
boy! •••• (a n dJ 1 itt 1 e H a r r y, poor Eli z a ISO n 1 y chi 1 d ! I II (Q!'£ , p • 8 2), but 
Mr. Shelby responds by making a generalized statement about what 
society sanctions, IIII don't know why I am to be rated, as if I were a 
mon s ter, for do ing wha t everyone doe s every day'" (UT.£,p. 8 2) and 
appealing to conclusions on the morality of slavery by "'many wise and 
p i 0 u s men'" (Q!'£ , p • 8 3 ) • 
Shelby also makes plans to avoid witnessing the actual result of 
what he's done: "'I'm going to get out my horse bright and early, and 
b e 0 f f • I can Its e e Tom, t hat • s a f act • .. (Q!'£, p • 8 6 ) • The con nee t ion 
between this and his arguments is obvious: Shelby's conscience-easing 
rationalizations are only effective if he can nullify the human con-
nection between himself and Tom, and hence deny his responsibility to 
behave toward him in a caring way. His need, however, to add physical 
distance to the psychological distance of abstract generalization, 
does indicate some discomfort with the morality of what he is doing: 
" I twa sin v a i nth a the s aid to him s elf t hat h e had a !.i9.hl to do 
it,--that everybody did it ••• he could not satisfy his own feelings" 
(UTC, p. 169) • 
With the discovery of Eliza's flight, however, this discomfort 
disappears, as does the tone of apology toward his wife. Shelby here 
can retreat into a clear and established system of rules for behavior--
the Southern code of honor. Now in response to Mrs. Shelby's support 
of Eliza he exclaims, '''Wife, you talk like a fooU •••• [thisJ touches 
my honor!'" (UTC,p.92). Unlike his wife, who covertly aids her servant's 
flight, Shelby unhesitatingly gives Haley's right to a fair bargain 
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precedence over his personal, unofficial responsibility to Eliza, 
telling Haley that he is in no way "'partner to any unfairness in this 
matter'" and promising him '''every assistance, in the use of horses, 
servants, &C., in the recovery of your property'" (UTC,p.95). 
The contrast between this moral outlook and Mrs. Shelby's attempt 
to uphold the values of connection and care is evident throughout this 
section-- she immediately refuses to be an "accomplice or help in this 
cruel business" and resolves instead to give her sympathy and support 
to Uncle Tom's family, so that "they shall see, at any rate, that 
their mistress can feel for and with them" (UTC,p.87). The event also 
leads her to an understanding of the evil of slavery which parallels 
Stowe's own. It is "Ia curse to the master and a curse to the 
slave,1It and her attempts to '"gild''' it with '''kindness, and care, 
and instruction'" were doomed to failure because of the institution's 
fundamental disregard for human connection. 
In the final conversation on Eliza's escape, then, we see a clear 
example of the kind of conflict between the "masculine" ethic of 
objective rules and the "feminine" one of empathetic response which 
will be central to the rest of the novel: 
'Come, come, Emily,' said he ••• 'you allow 
yourself to feel too much.' 
'Feel too much! Am not I a woman,--a mother? 
Are we not both responsible to God for this poor 
g i r 1 ? My God! I a y not t his sin too u r c h a r g e. I 
'What sin, Emily? You see yourself that we 
have only done what we were obliged to.1 
'There's an awful feeling of guilt about it 
though, ••• I can't reason it away' (9.1:£, p.133). 
The conflict hidden in this conversation goes deeper than a 
simple difference of opinion. There is a basic gap in comprehension 
between Mr. Shelby and his wife, which points up the problem of intel-
lectual and moral legitimacy faced by the female advocate of an ethic 
of care. "Feeling" to Mr. Shelby signifies a purely local emotional 
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response which is extraneous to the realm of moral and social order. 
Hence negative feelings about an action which is defensible in "objec-
tive" terms are an indulgence, or at least an unnecessary discomfort. 
"Feeling" to Mrs. She however, is at the center of moral order. 
The central experience of connection, care and responsibili she has 
as a mother is the model for moral relations with the rest of humanity. 
Here it is abstract judgements, made without reference to the real 
human connections involved, which are extraneous, so that guilt felt 
at severing connections can't be "reasoned" away. But because she 
lacks the terms to argue the logic and legitimacy of her view, her 
reply leaves the impression that she is simply falling prey to her 
irrational emotions. 
The same problem emerges in Mrs. Bird's conversation with her 
husband on the passing of the Fugitive Slave Bill. In her husband's 
eyes, her feelings on the matter are no more than a kind of simplis-
tic, mushy emotionalism, made agreeable by its piety and warm-hearted-
ness, but having no real bearing on the complex social and moral 
issues involved. Not surprisingly, he views her insistence on them 
with "a whimsical mixture of amusement and vexation" (UTC,p.l46). 
But with an awareness of the coherent ethical view which under-
lies Mrs. Bird's "feelings," and the centrality of that view to 
Stowe's critique of slavery, her response begins to seem less irratio-
n a 1. Fro m her per s p e c t i v e, the pro b 1 e m lie s a s m u chi nth e !~!.!!!..§. 0 f 
the arguments as in their content. Political argument is founded upon 
premises which mean that discussions will go "'round and round a plain 
right thing'!! without being able to see it. Mrs. Bird's !!'I hate 
reasoning, John,--especially reasoning on such subjects'!! p.145) , 
like Mrs. Shelby's refusal to !!reason away" her sense of guilt, is 
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essentially a rejection of argument on those terms. It is not a rejec-
tion of any use of the intellect, but rather seeks to replace this 
particular kind of reasoning with that referred to (negatively) by the 
selfish woman on the steamboat with Uncle Tom, who in response to a 
neighbor's comment on slavery's "'outrages on the feelings and affec-
tions,'" replies, '''We can't reason from our feelings to those of this 
c las s 0 f per son s ,II (Q!.f , p • 2 0 0 ) • 
Critics' view of this response has tended to parallel that of Mr. 
Shelby and Senator Bird. Contemporary reviewers usually condemned 
Stowe for lack of objectivity and respect for law and political pro-
cess. She was unable, one said, to attain the "judicial seat ••• fixed 
high above human passions,,,17 and, in typical feminine fashion, judged 
issues entirely by her uncontrolled emotions. Foster, who has 
greater respect overall for the intelligence of Stowe's analysis of 
slavery, still sees UTC as having "a tendency to split into two books" 
which work against each other. One is the "literary-senti~ental­
pious," best represented by Mrs. Bird, which the book would be better 
without (the novel is "a battle between piety and ••• talent"), and the 
other the "sharp intelligence" (and "masculine edge") of Stowe's 
critique of the institution of slavery through Augustine St. Clare. 18 
What Mrs. Bird actually represents, though, is Stowe's own rejec-
tion of the premises of pro-slavery arguments because they deny the 
place of empathy--a rejection which manifests itself as much in Augus-
tine St. Clare's reflections as in Mary Bird's. Stowe is nowhere 
particularly interested in arguing with slaveholders on their own 
ground--in trying to prove, for example, that slavery does not bring 
about "the greatest good for the greatest number." Instead, she 
attacks the whole idea of dealing with living, breathing individuals 
as abstractions, terms in a "moral calculus," just as in the New 
30 
England novels she condemned theologians who "deal... with the great 
question of the salvation or damnation of myriads as a problem of 
theological algebra, to be worked out by their inevitable x,y,ztl (OTF, 
p.562). 
To the extent that Stowe does attack the content of pro-slavery 
arguments, she usually does so by providing an alternative logic which 
does not so much disprove the original as show the arbitrary quality 
inherent in the choice of a basis for argument. On the steamboat 
carrying Uncle Tom south, a clergyman breaks into a conversation on 
the morality of slavery with the comment, 
tI'I t' s undoubted ly the in ten t ion of Prov ide nee 
that the African race should be servants,--kept in 
a low cond i t ion •••• "Cur sed be Canaan; a ser van t of 
servants shall he be," the scripture says •••• and 
we must not set up our opinion against that'" 
(UTC , P • 200) • 
In response, a young man "with a face expressive of great feeling 
and intelligence" breaks in and remarks, "P'AII things whatsoever ye 
would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." I 
suppose ••• that is scr ipture, as much as "Cursed be Canaan.'''" The 
"honest drover" John concludes, '''Wal, it seems quite as plain a text, 
stranger, ••• to poor fellows like us, now'" C!!!£,p.20l). As the young 
parson's comment points out, both texts are equally valid bases for a 
scriptural argument on slavery. The older man's preference for the 
former is clearly based on unconscious self-interest, while the young 
man's advocacy of the latter is based on his ability to reason from 
his own feelings to those of others: 
'My friend, ••• how can you, how dare you, carryon 
a trade like this? Look at these poor creatures! 
Here I am, rejoicing in my heart that I am going 
home to my wife and child; and the same bell which 
is a signal to carry me onward towards them will 
part this poor man and his wife forever' (UTC,p.202). 
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This recognition that seemingly "objective" logical arguments can 
be constructed to prove the necessity of almost anything is also at 
the core of St. Clare's cynical commentary on slavery: 
'Suppose that something should bring down the 
price of cotton once and forever, and make the 
whole slave property a drug in the market, don't 
you think we should soon have another version of 
the Scripture doctrine? What a flood of light 
would pour into the church, all at once, and how 
immediately it would be discovered that everything 
in the Bible and reason went the other wayl' 
(UTC,p. 281) • 
St. Clare recognizes that the motivation behind any such argument is 
an attempt to rationalize and obscure a refusal to respond. The funda-
mental perspective underlying pro-slavery logic is that of the "aris-
tocrat": 
'Now, an aristocrat, you know, the world over, has 
no human sympathies, beyond a certain line in 
soc iety •••• Wha t would be har dsh ip and dis tr e ss and 
injustice in his own class, is a cool matter of 
co u r s e ina not her 0 n e I (Q!'£, p • 3 5 5 ) • 
What St. Clare has done, essentially, is to articulate in intelligent 
and coherent terms what Mrs. Bird meant by saying "I hate reasoning." 
The major difference between the two is that Mrs. Bird has a greater 
faith in the ability (and willingness) of an individual to see through 
the maze of obscuring logic to a "plain right thing," and then do it. 
Here too, perhaps both are reasoning from their own feelings, for it 
is a notable fact that Mrs. Bird acts, while St. Clare does not. 
W hat doe s s u c hac t ion con sis t 0 f? I nth e w 0 rId 0 f Q!!.£l~ !.2. m ' s 
Cabin, in which, as we have seen, moral disorder is institutionalized, 
how does one approach the task of re-establishing moral order? As 
Stowe's critique of slavery makes clear, in such a world the "objec-
tive," rule-oriented approach to ethical reason and action which 
Gilligan describes as characteristically "masculine" is not appro-
priate. positive moral action in these novels tends, rather, to align 
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closely with Gilligan's description of "feminine" moral priorities. 
Moral characters seek first and foremost to maintain relation-
ships, both for the sake of the relationships themselves and because 
lines of communication must be kept open for moral response to be 
pos sible. This explains why, for example, Mrs. Bird and Mrs. Shelby 
respond to their husbands' morally dubious actions in a way which Ann 
Douglas associates with the weak and acquiescent credo 
popularized by Go~~ and other similar ladies' 
magazines: women were to use the moral suasion of 
example and mild precept to turn their men to more 
humane (or feminine) ways: women were never dir-
ectly to oppose men, no matter how stupid or 
brutal they might be. 19 
Mrs. Shelby would never "threaten to leave" her husband as a way of 
stopping him from selling Tom and Harry, as Douglas later suggests she 
ought, because to try to assert the moral responsibility implied in 
human connections (i.e. his with Tom) by breaking off her connection 
with him would be a contradiction in terms. 
Furthermore, it is this connection which keeps open the possi-
bility of moral change in her husband. This process is akin to what 
Douglas describes as "the moral suasion of example and mild precept," 
which was all women were permitted to oppose to the stupidity and 
brutality of men. But, at least as Stowe intends it, this is not the 
indirect, unassertive, and oppressively limiting stance that modern 
critics like Douglas often take it to be. Again, it is important here 
to "separate the description of care and connection from the vocabulary 
of inequality and oppression."20 Within a view of moral order as 
relying on connection and response to need, the "act of assertion" 
needed to try to reestablish order "is an act not of aggression but of 
communication."21 The concern which both Emily Shelby and Mary Bird 
show for getting across their moral point without seriously alienating 
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their husbands stems not from dependence and fear but from a sense 
that keeping lines of communication open is an important moral priority. 
This concern is linked with a determination to maintain the web 
of universal responsibility and care in the face of an official struc-
ture which denies its legitimacy and works to dissolve its bonds. 
Moral characters persist in viewing situations of moral choice in 
terms of the varying needs for care and help of the individuals 
involved , rather than in terms of objective classifications. Thus 
for Mrs. Shelby, covertly aiding Eliza's escape easily takes pre-
cedence over issues of legality or "honor," as for Mrs. Bird the 
presence of a suffering fugitive makes the existence of a Fugitive 
Slave Bill irrelevant. This is also the whole basis for moral choice 
in the Ohio Quaker community Stowe portrays. The Quakers are as 
willing to give aid to a suffering and abandoned slavecatcher as to a 
fugitive, even though he could conceivably betray them. Here the 
Quakers resist the temptation to objectify what they are doing into a 
"cause" the "greater good" of which is more important than anyone 
individual. 
These moral values are also what defines Uncle Tom as a charac-
ter. He is not concerned with what rights, in fairness, he is enti-
tled to claim for himself, but with what the needs of others around 
him are which it is possible for him to fulfill. This, rather than 
acquiescence to an oppressive and unjust law, explains his refusal to 
run away at the beginning and the end of the book. Although he 
recognizes that others, such as Eliza and Cassie, can run away without 
sin, he himself puts concern for others before his own needs: at the 
Shelbys' the concern is for the slaves who would be sold in his stead, 
and at Legree's, for those he might yet be able to help to God if he 
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remains. 
Even with an understanding of the ethical perspective which 
underlies the action of characters like Tom, however, there are still 
questions which can be raised about what appears to be the limited 
effectiveness of this approach to the problem of slavery. Stowe IS 
rejection of the kind of abstract, "greatest good" arguments prevalent 
in politics seems to confine moral action to an individual level--the 
level of personal help or influence. It is hard then to see how she 
intends to bring about change on an institutional level. The model 
for the reformist seems to be Edward Clayton in Dred, who abandons his 
attempt to reform his culture in favor of flight and the foundation of 
a model community with his former slaves in Canada, or the Quakers, 
who help many a fugitive slave but will not resist or "speak evil of 
[the] rulers" who penalize them for doing so (UTC,p.224). 
Further, Stowels rejection of aggression and violence, even in 
self-defense, seems to doom slaves to the status of victims. The 
title character in Dred, for example, originally plans a violent 
uprising as retribution for the sins of the slaveholders, and to 
rescue oppressed slaves. Through her presentation of his character 
(Dred speaks almost exclusively in the language of Old Testament 
prophecy) and situation of slaves in the novel, Stowe makes clear that 
such retribution would be entirely just. But before the insurrection 
can take place, Dred is converted from his Old Testament revenge 
orientation to Christian patience and pacifism, and is eventually 
killed by slave hunters. The ultimate representation of the pacifist 
as victim, of course, is Uncle Tom, who passes up the opportunity to 
kill Legree and free the whole plantation from a demonic and soul-
killing master, and is cruelly beaten to death as a reward. 
Clearly a large part of the explanation for this orientation lies 
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in Stowe's Christianity--Tom's reward (and Dred's) is a greater and 
surer one than this world can offer, so that his fate, and even his 
effectiveness, on earth is not the only matter for consideration. But 
there is a more pragmatic reason also for Stowe's rejection of vio-
lence, one which relates to the moral perspective I have been out-
lining here. Stowe quite accurately perceives that violence will cut 
the lines of communication decisively, making it impossible to bring 
about change in the perceptions of those doing wrong. Bringing vio-
lence into a conflict will polarize all concerned, and make change 
impossible unless imposed by force (which it would be unlikely for 
slaves to be able to do). 
On the issue of the scale of effectiveness of attempts, within 
Stowe's moral framework, to restore moral order, we must finally step 
out of the world of her novels to understand her view. Stowe's view 
of the proper response to the moral evil of slavery--and of the likely 
effec tiveness of that response--is ultimately to be found not in the 
act ion s 0 fan yon e 0 f her c h a r act e r s but i nth e act 0 f w r i tin g .!:!l!£.!~ 
Tom's Cabin itself. --- ---- Where moral order is seen as the recognition by 
all of interconnectedness and inter responsiveness, the conviction that 
change is possible at all translates into a conviction that people can 
be made to see and understand suffering and their responsibility for 
it, and that they will then act on the basis of that understanding. 
Stowe clearly expresses this conviction in her appeal to her readers 
at the end of UTC: 
when [the author] heard ••• Chr istian and humane 
people actually recommending the remanding [o~] 
escaped fugitives into slavery, as a duty binding 
on good citizens,--when she heard, on all hands, 
from kind, compassionate and estimable people, ••• 
deliberations and discussions as to what Christian 
duty could be on this head,--she could only think, 
These men and Christians cannot know what slavery 
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is; if they did, such a question could never be 
open for discussion. And from this arose a desire 
to exhibit it in a livin~ £~~ati£ reality (UTC,p.623). 
With this in mind, Stowe's use of the techniques of "sentimental" 
fiction, the point on which she has received the most and strongest 
criticism from both contemporary and modern critics, needs to be re-
evaluated. Stowe is undeniably making a conscious effort to appeal to 
the hearts of her readers--to stir up strong emotions on behalf of her 
characters. But this is being done neither so that uncontrolled 
emotion may cloud judgement and reason, as Foster and many others 
suggest, nor to evoke the kind of complacent, "narcissistic" orgy of 
feeling which Douglas describes at the beginning of The Feminization 
of American Cultur~.22 Rather Stowe is trying to initiate in her 
readers the kind of "reasoning" process referred to by the woman on 
the steamboat--the use of one's own experience of relationships to 
gain insight into another's perpective. An "objectivity" which denies 
a place to this kind of understanding is actually partiality, for it 
refuses to recognize the ways reason can be twisted to self-interest: 
One might almost imagine that there were no such 
thing as absolute truth, since a change of situa-
tion or temperament is capable of changing the 
whole force of an argument ••• We shall never have 
all the materials for absolute truth on this sub-
ject, till we take into account, with our own 
views and reasonings, the views and reasonings of 
those who have bowed down to the yoke, and felt 
the iron enter into their souls. We all console 
ourselves too easily for the sorrows of others. 
We talk and reason coolly of that which, did we 
feel it ourselves, would take away all power of 
composure and self-control. We have seen how the 
masters feel and reason •••• We must add, also, to 
our estimate, the feelings and reasonings of the 
slave (~~~£,II,p.2l3). 
To this end, the narrator of UTC continually asks the reader 
directly to consult his or her own feelings: "If it were Y.£.!:!£. 
Harry... that were going to be torn from you by a brutal trader ••• how 
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fast could Y2.!! walk?"(UTC,p.I05). Certainly this serves to heighten 
the emotional intensity of the experience of reading the novel, with 
whatever pleasure that entails in itself, but the narrator constant 
reminds the reader that this emotional experience refers outside of 
the novel to actual society. The reader uses it as a basis for under-
standing the lived reality of slavery, something he or she is likely 
to lose track of otherwise, just as the Quaker Ruth '''uses [her] self 
only to learn how to love [hE;!r;] neighbor'" (UTC,p.22 
This stress on empathy, of course, also explains Stowe's tendency 
to focus on victims rather than victors. The re-establishment of 
moral order is dependent on the communication of a need for response 
and care, and therefore the novel with seeks to make that communica-
tion must focus on those who need care rather than on those, like 
George Harris, who can take care of themselves. 
To point out a coherent and distinctively feminine ethical view 
which underlies the characters, actions, and opinions expressed in 
Stowe's fiction, to pick out a legitimate and perceptive critique of 
the dominant masculine view which is contained within it, and to show 
the ways in which that dominant view can distort, trivialize, and 
finally disregard both the contrasting ethic and its implied critique 
--all of these will not eliminate certain recurring problems of awk-
wardness and cliche in Stowe's writing, problems which make it unlikely 
that Stowe will ever be classed with the finest literary craftsmen of 
the 19th century. But it can lead to a greater respect for the 
intelligence and perception which underlie the novels--their psycho-
logical craftsmanship--and to a less ambivalent assessment of the 
power and appeal of Uncle Tom's f~bin. Stowe may have underestimated 
the self-interest of the Southerner, and the prejudice of the Norther-
ner, such that the results of her consciousness raising efforts were not 
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as peaceful, Christian, and loving as she hoped; but on the whole the 
assumptions on which she wrote UTC were no more irrational, naive, or 
impractical than any moral view which maintains that actual improve-
ments in the morality of society can be brought about. The ethic 
which informed the writing of Uncle Tom's Cabin is, in part, validated 
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